Repost: Global Recon Report, “The U.S.-Iran Conflict Is not a “New War.”"

REPOSTWorldUSA
Written By Guy Ginton

I follow U.S. Army vet Nicholas Valencia, aka Global Recon Report, on IG to get informed takes on global conflicts. And I mean dozens of conflicts, like ones in Africa that we rarely hear about because, as they say, “no Jews, no news.” I highly rec giving him a follow on Instagram, reading and restacking his work on Substack, and subscribing if you have the means. I am still on team “I am not paying for 50+ Substacks while my income is not great,” but GRR is at the top of my list if I ever make it big. And Nicholas, if you catch wind that I am reposting your work without permission on my humble blog, feel free to reach out if you want me to take it down. Or if you prefer, I’ll buy you a few rounds in Tel Aviv.

This is about the U.S., my home for the majority of my life, not Israel. So I am not placing it in the Jewish-centered section of my blog.

Link to his substack, I encourage you to click on: https://globalreconreport.substack.com/p/opinion-the-us-iran-conflict-is-not

In short: Valencia argues that the U.S.–Iran conflict is not a sudden escalation but the continuation of a long-running shadow war marked by proxy attacks, maritime seizures, cyber operations, and regional power plays. He argues Iran has consistently used asymmetric tactics and allied militias to pressure U.S. forces and partners while avoiding full-scale conventional war. He frames the situation as a strategic contest shaped by deterrence, signaling, and calculated risk on both sides, not as a brand-new war.

Opinion: The U.S.-Iran Conflict Is not a “New War.”

Nicholas Valencia; Mar 03, 2026

In the wake of the recent U.S. and Israeli military strikes on Iran that began on February 28, 2026, resulting in the death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and triggering Iranian retaliatory attacks across the region, some observers have described this as the outbreak of a new war. This claim overlooks the reality of a conflict that has persisted for more than four decades. The current escalations are part of a long timeline of hostilities rooted in Iran’s post-1979 revolutionary ideology, its sponsorship of terrorism through proxies, its pursuit of nuclear capabilities, and repeated direct and indirect challenges to U.S. interests and allies. Acknowledging this is essential for understanding the situation and formulating responses that address the underlying threat rather than treating each phase as an isolated incident.

From a legal standpoint, U.S. military action against Iran is still being carried out under existing authorities, not new ones.

The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force targets al-Qaeda and associated forces, a category that includes entities Iran has supported or sheltered. The 2002 Iraq AUMF addresses regional threats in the broader Middle East context. These frameworks have supported operations against Iranian-linked groups for years, without needing fresh congressional declarations for extensions of ongoing hostilities. Internationally, Iran’s long-standing support for terrorism violates UN Charter Article 2(4), which prohibits the threat or use of force against other states, while Article 51 permits defensive measures in response to armed attacks. The War Powers Resolution allows the president to respond to imminent threats when connected to historical patterns.

Calling the current escalation a “new war” simply ignores the decades of direct and indirect attacks on the US and its allies conducted by Iran.

The history of U.S.-Iran relations since 1979 demonstrates a clear pattern of antagonism initiated by Iran’s revolutionary regime and met with U.S. countermeasures aimed at containment. The conflict began in November 1979 when Iranian militants seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, holding 52 Americans hostage for 444 days, an act that violated diplomatic norms and set the stage for decades of hostility. Ayatollah Khomeini’s labeling of the United States as the “Great Satan” highlights the ideological foundation of this opposition.

During the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War, Iran-backed Hezbollah carried out the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 241 American service members. U.S. naval forces engaged Iranian forces in the Persian Gulf to counter mining operations, and in 1988, the USS Vincennes accidentally downed Iran Air Flight 655.

In the 1990s, Iran accelerated its nuclear program while continuing to support terrorism, including the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia that killed 19 U.S. airmen. The United States responded with economic sanctions under the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, employing non-military tools to limit Iran’s capabilities.

After the September 11, 2001, attacks, Iran harbored al-Qaeda operatives and armed Shia militias in Iraq and Afghanistan with explosively formed penetrators or “EFPs” that contributed to hundreds of U.S. deaths. Designated part of the “Axis of Evil” in 2002, Iran became integrated into the broader U.S. counterterrorism framework under the 2001 AUMF.

Proxy conflicts intensified from 2011 to 2018, with Iran supporting the Assad regime in Syria, leading to U.S. strikes on Iranian assets and arming the Houthis in Yemen, who targeted U.S. ships in 2016. The 2015 JCPOA nuclear agreement represented a temporary diplomatic effort, but U.S. withdrawal in 2018 and reimposed sanctions followed Iran’s non-compliance. Tensions peaked in 2019–2020 under the “maximum pressure” campaign, with Iran downing a U.S. drone, attacking oil tankers, and directing proxy assaults on the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. The U.S. strike that killed IRGC General Qasem Soleimani in January 2020 came in response to attacks on American personnel, and Iran’s missile strikes on U.S. bases in Iraq continued the cycle of retaliation within the established conflict.

From 2021 to 2023, Iran advanced uranium enrichment to near-weapons-grade levels while its proxies, including the Houthis and Hezbollah, conducted numerous attacks on U.S. forces in Syria and Iraq. The October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel, backed by Iranian support, further linked these dynamics to regional instability, prompting additional U.S. strikes on IRGC targets. Escalations continued in 2024 with Iran’s direct missile attacks on Israel in April and U.S. defensive assistance, Houthi disruptions in the Red Sea leading to U.S.-led strikes, and a January 2024 proxy drone attack in Jordan that killed three U.S. soldiers. This continued escalation ultimately led to the 12-day Iran-Israel war in June 2025, sparked by Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear and military sites during stalled nuclear talks. The United States intervened by targeting three key Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22, 2025, leading to a U.S.-brokered ceasefire on June 23–24.

The most recent phase began on February 28, 2026, when the United States and Israel launched coordinated strikes codenamed Operation Epic Fury by the U.S. and Roaring Lion by Israel targeting Iranian nuclear sites, missile facilities, military infrastructure, and leadership. These operations resulted in the deaths of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other senior figures, with stated goals of preventing nuclear weapon development, degrading missile and naval capabilities, and addressing regime threats. Iran retaliated with missile and drone attacks on Israel and U.S. bases across the region, including in Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates. The conflict has widened, with Hezbollah launching attacks on Israel and further exchanges occurring as of early March 2026.

This reveals consistent elements: Iran’s use of proxies such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, and various militias for deniable aggression since the 1980s; its nuclear program as a longstanding strategic priority from the 1990s onward; and U.S. actions centered on deterrence and response rather than unprovoked initiation. Legal affirmations, including those surrounding the Soleimani strike, confirm these operations as extensions of prior authorities, in contrast to entirely new conflicts, such as the 2003 Iraq invasion. Iran’s leadership has framed the United States as an ideological enemy, pursuing regional influence through asymmetric means. Proxy warfare has accounted for more American casualties than direct confrontations, and international mechanisms, including ICJ proceedings on state-sponsored terrorism, have treated these as elements of prolonged hostilities.

Calling this a “new war” shrinks the bigger picture and acts like the last four decades never happened. It treats the situation as a clean break instead of the latest phase in a long-running fight. If policy is going to make sense, it has to start from that reality. That means relying on the policies already in place, tightening pressure on IRGC networks, working closely with regional partners to limit proxy activity, pushing accountability through international channels, and being honest with the public about the full historical record instead of pretending this all began yesterday.

The U.S.-Iran confrontation has been happening for over 45 years. Confronting it effectively requires a perspective informed by the full scope of its history, guiding decisions that prioritize security and stability in an increasingly volatile region.

Final Thoughts & Plugs

Well put. Unfortunately, facts and international law do not seem to matter. As Valencia has repeatedly pointed out, if people actually cared about international law, they would first criticize the Islamic State for targeting civilians, using ballistic missiles, and deliberately poisoning their own people. For those who care about human rights, this conflict is a no-brainer.

For more on this subject, read my various op-eds on the Times of Israel blog:

Or visit the Jude section of my blog, where I am hoping to expose at least one horrible supporter of the Islamic State each day. I discuss what personality traits lead them to blindly hate their own country while defending states that gouge the eyes out of their own people. I also have reposts such as:

PS: Going back through old posts, it is clear I need to get off Squarespace already. There were so many updates to articles that did not save, so much stylistic problem, and so many corrupted files. What a terrible service. I do not love Substack either, but Squarespace is overpriced garbage. If only there was more time in the day.

Guy Ginton https://kingchill.com
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